The appeal of 4-day test matches

Recently, the ICC set the proverbial cat amongst the pigeons with by saying that it was going to consider the idea of 4-day test matches. If the cricketing world was looking forward to a quiet new year, this certainly yanked people off the usual boilerplate end-of-the-year self-congratulatory tweets. Suddenly, people were divided into two camps—the ones who thought it was a good idea (the likes of Michael Vaughan) and the ones who thought who thought it wasn’t (Sachin Tendulkar and many others). Let us examine what such a possibility may entail.

Cricket is a unique sport among those with a large following that its format has been tinkered with from time to time in order to fit it better with respect to the ongoing temporal demands. While the length of a football match has been 90 minutes (normal time), cricket has changed its spots often. First of all, cricket has three formats at the international level (with some new-fangled ones bound to enter the fray). The overs in an innings of the showpiece that is the ODI World Cup has varied from 50 to 60. Even in the “original format” of test cricket, the duration has varied between 3-day and “timeless” tests; heck, even the balls per over was not six always. Then what is the big fuss?

The argument behind such a move is financial—already very few teams can afford to play test cricket and the uncertainty regarding the fifth day’s expense burns a hole in many a broadcaster’s and home association’s pockets. And, considering the recent trends of an increasing number of tests finishing before the fifth day, this seems like a natural progression. Also, test matches can follow a Thursday to Sunday calendar, which is friendlier to the fans. So far, so good. But are there other reasons?

One of the peculiarities of test cricket is the draw (different from the tie); cricket fans worldwide have probably struggled to explain this concept to befuddled fans who don’t know much about the sport—how one can play a sport for days on end and still end up with no result? Only cricket fans know the value of a hard-fought draw. That idiosyncrasy aside, there is another pattern to be gleaned here—the Draw% indicates of how many matches finished with a result.

Decade	Matches	Draws	Draw%	Balls per test
1870s	3	0	0.00	1586.00
1880s	29	4	13.79	1666.97
1890s	32	6	18.75	1939.13
1900s	41	10	24.39	1803.41
1910s	29	4	13.79	1791.21
1920s	51	16	31.37	2247.33
1930s	89	36	40.45	2127.21
1940s	45	22	48.89	2378.04
1950s	164	51	31.10	2282.72
1960s	186	88	47.31	2409.01
1970s	198	84	42.42	2255.38
1980s	266	122	45.86	1986.76
1990s	347	124	35.73	2017.58
2000s	464	114	24.57	1974.86
2010s	433	84	19.40	1953.18

 

As the above table indicates, the 2010s has been a very productive decade for test cricket, with more than 80% of the matches ending up in a result (100%-draw% practically gives the result% as only 2 tests were tied throughout test cricket). This is a far cry from the days of, say, 1960s to 1980s, when this number was well south of 60%. The balls per test also shows an interesting trend with the draw%–both move in the same direction and seem to be correlated. Reducing the number of days is bound to eat into this high figure and push the percentage of results lower. The ICC plans to counter this by increasing the number of overs bowled in a day to 98, resulting in a “real loss” of 58 overs. Of course, one could also argue that pitches could be prepared accordingly and that the test match might “settle” into a new “rhythm”, but there are other inherent dangers.

One of them is weather related. In the sub-continent, cricket is a winter-time sport (unlike in England, SA, NZ, and Australia, where it is a summer-time sport) and teams routinely struggle to bowl 90 overs in a day, leave alone a greater number. And this problem is exacerbated at higher latitudes (as the duration of daylight reduces as the latitude increases). This was one of the factors why the Ranji Trophy increased the duration of the knockout matches—to increase the chances of an outright result. Additionally, the benevolence of the weather gods would play a bigger part—one washed out day has greater consequences. Both these factors would reduce the number of results.

The other is about the spinners. Though spinners have played important roles in test cricket, from a statistical perspective, they have slightly “inferior” records than fast bowlers (lower percentage of pure batsmen dismissed, lower bowling averages, higher strike rates and so on); this is natural since fast bowlers bowl before them and set the “tone” for the match—just the nature of the game, that is all.  But slice the numbers based on the innings number, you see a different pattern.

Innings	Bowling Average (spinner)	Bowling Average (pacer)
First	40.03	31.68
Second	35.09	31.56
Third	30.76	28.75
Fourth	28.30	27.68

 

As the test match progresses, the spinners show drastic improvement (~30% over the 4 innings), indicating the help they receive from the deterioration of the playing surface. For a fast bowler? Not as much—it does become easier to bowl, but the improvement isn’t as colossal (~13%). Yes, these figures aren’t grouped by Day 1 to 5 (ball-by-ball data wasn’t available until recently), but these trends are too big to ignore by themselves and are indicative of increasing assistance for spinners. Without the aid of an additional day (in which the pitch would be exposed to the elements and deteriorate further), spinners will surely suffer and be relegated to second-class citizens unless turning pitches are made world over.

The workload of the bowlers would increase as well, with each bowler having to bowl more number of overs per day. And, some of the most memorable matches have gone the distance—think Kolkata 2001 or the recent South Africa-England test. Decreasing the duration would only rob fans of some classic finishes.

Hence, the reasons to play test cricket over 4 days are purely financial; according to calculations for this test cycle (2015-2023), reducing the tests by a day would “free up” 335 days, which the boards can use as they please (probably to schedule more T20s to subsidize test cricket). Therefore, at best, the ICC should trial this in the matches involving the newer teams to reduce the costs and not tinker with the 5-day formula for the World Test Championship as it has a lot of balance for all players involved.

 

India–behind the curve in T20s

In a see-sawing match, a floundering and error-prone India overcame a plucky Bangladesh to win the match and the series. For a while, when Indian were under the pump, it looked like Bangladesh would take the game away but one over turned the match on its head and India was a relieved team to walk away with the series in tow; just a few days earlier, India had lost its first ever T20 match to the eastern neighbours. Yes, the Indian team was shorn of some of its biggest stars for this series, but Bangladesh was missing some of its stars as well. While this defeat didn’t quite feel like the sucker punch that led India to prematurely exit the World Cup in 2007, it had been a long while coming.

About three years ago, Mushfiqur Rahim had almost dragged his team across the line in a pulsating encounter at the 2016 World T20; but somehow, that Bangladesh team had found a way to lose the match at the death, losing three wickets in the last three balls. Such a hiccup wouldn’t happen this time around—Bangladesh didn’t lose the opportunity to beat its more fancied opponent. But these results were more a reflection of how much India has been behind the curve in the sport’s shortest format for a while now.

India’s excellent test team and its depth has been a topic of discussion recently, and rightly so. Additionally its ODI team is possibly the best-ever in its cricketing history. But the story is quite different in the T20 format.  India started the series in the fifth place—a fair reflection of where it stands in this format. It is hard to believe that a team which took to the format like a duck to the water in the inaugural World T20, and has, arguably, the world’s best T20 domestic league is an also-ran in this format.

Over the last few years, the Indian team management has been treating T20s as a proving ground for fresh talent seeking a place in the Indian team. Back in 2017, Ravi Shastri said:

“T20 cricket for us, we don’t care. You win or lose, it doesn’t matter, but give youngsters the opportunity so you come to know who is in the fray for 2019.”

Many, many matches later, India still doesn’t know the identity of the middle order or that of the keeper. What is worse, by conflating the two formats, it is doing a disservice to both. This has been happening with such regularity that it isn’t even funny anymore.

Though cricket fans may view T20 as a compressed version of the ODI, it is fundamentally a different sport. You may argue that it is still 11-on-11, played in the same stadium, with same rules and so on, but the grammar of the sport makes it very different from the two longer formats. The balls per dismissal hovers ~65 in tests and ~38 in ODIs. But in T20Is, this number dips drastically to ~17 but you still have ten wickets! Meaning, on average, a batsman in T20Is faces about three overs, and he has to maximize returns in this short stint at the wicket, which turns traditional cricket thinking on its head. So go-to phrases from the commentator/TV pundit manual such as “playing yourself in”, “set batsman” and “why didn’t he just take a single after scoring a big shot instead of going for another” don’t apply in this format, more so in the first innings when you are looking to maximize the score. Therefore, T20 batting is the antithesis of batting wisdom in the longer formats.

And this is where India has always missed a trick—by not focussing on strike rate or run rate. Primarily, what has been holding India back has been a conservative approach to batting—an extension of the affliction affecting the ODI team as well. Over the last five years, against top teams, India has been the best side while chasing, but has an average record while setting the target—suggesting that India struggles to read the conditions right and set an appropriate target more often than not.

At the top of the order are Rohit Sharma, Shikhar Dhawan, and Virat Kohli, the most-feared top order in ODI cricket today; but they don’t lead the pack in T20Is in terms of strike rate (only Rohit makes the top 10). One look at the IPL stats, it is the same story there as well. Virat Kohli has made an unearthly 60 runs per dismissal in T20Is over the last 5 years. But guess what? At his strike rate of 139, when <7 wickets is enough to last the entire 20 overs in the average T20I, two Evin Lewises will overcome his output on a consistent basis. To be fair, Rohit Sharma has upped his game over the last few years (like he did so in the second match), but there is perhaps only one spot (at most) for a “classical batsman” who can motor along as other players “explode” around this fulcrum. But what has affected the team over the last few years is that it is filled with several “me-too” batsmen who play with this attitude. Instead, Indian batsmen should learn to value their wickets far lesser in the T20 format and learn to “go for it” from ball 1.

The problem with the batting is only emblematic of the larger problem affecting the Indian team—it is too slow to adapt to the evolution of the format around the cricketing world and picking up best practices. It was too late to the wrist spin party; it took a really long time to give chances to spin-bowling all-rounders such as Krunal Pandya who have much better batting chops than Axar Patel (this is in spite of having seen good performances in the IPL); it isn’t thinking of experimenting by sending a pinch-hitter at the top of the order (in the mould of Sunil Narine or Moeen Ali) to maximize returns; heck, BCCI doesn’t even allow players to participate in overseas leagues even when there are no domestic or India commitments. No wonder India’s understanding of the game is quite limited.

With the 2020 World T20 looming large, and with the team falling short in previous editions, India should pull its socks up in the upcoming 20-odd matches in the format if it has to take a serious step towards correcting the anomaly.

 

What is the point of the WTC points system?

After much deliberation and many, many false starts, the ICC World Test Championship is finally underway. Test cricket is undoubtedly the most storied of the three cricketing formats, but one big complaint that many fans have repeated over the years is that there was no “context” and a “central narrative” to this glorious game. Make no mistake, much of the fables of test cricket have been relayed from generation to generation through heroic deeds in (mostly) bilateral series, but results in one series rarely had an impact outside of that “context”. Now, with this system, there is something—a big, shiny trophy—to play for, for the top two teams in the league phase, culminating in a final at Lord’s. As an aside, this time around, if the final match were to result in a draw or a tie, both teams will be declared as joint winners.

All good then? More fans will buy into this new-fangled system? Not quite. I’m not convinced.

In a nutshell, the ICC World Test Championship is a league competition for Test cricket, with the top two teams advancing to a one-off (playoff) final to decide the winner. While this sounds good in theory, there are many flies in the ointment. Dig deeper by going to the ICC World Test Championship FAQ page, you’ll be left asking—What the FAQ?

Take, for instance, the points system. Throughout cricketing history, the length of test series have varied from 1 to 6 test matches (let us ignore the number of days in a test match for the time being); these could be because of market reasons, competitive reasons (test cricket rarely sees upsets) and others. And, as Ravi Shastri has reminded us ad nauseam, all 4 results are possible in test cricket: win, tie, draw, and loss.

No. of tests in series	Win	Tie	Draw	Loss
2	60	30	20	0
3	40	20	13	0
4	30	15	10	0
5	24	12	8	0

 

Looking at the above table, especially examining the ratio of points between a win, draw, and loss, the inspiration behind the scoring system becomes obvious—the 3-1-0 or “Three points for a win” formula of football. This system (which superseded the 2-1-0 system) encouraged more attacking play as both teams stood to gain two extra points by “going for the win”. An argument can be made that teams will be encouraged to “push for the result” here as well. For instance, in 2011, with this points system, it would be hard to imagine Dhoni’s India playing out a draw in Roseau; when systemic incentives are aligned this way, teams would be more encouraged to secure maximum points.

But then, is the above table really similar to the model followed in the footballing world? Take any top league in European football, for instance. Each team plays every other team twice, once at home and once away; in a 20-team league, each team plays 38 matches. Of course, fixture congestion and injuries can play a minor role, but this format is fairer compared to that of a knockout competition, in which upsets are more common. It is very rare that someone like the 2015-16 Leicester City team wins a league competition after 38 games—kinda similar to the test format. But herein lies the important difference—every one of the 38 games is equal, with an equal number of points on offer.

First of all, in the Test Championship, all teams don’t play each other in each cycle (India vs Pakistan is another matter altogether); but more importantly, in the above table, some test matches are worth more than the others. Additionally, there is nothing in this system that factors in the difficulty of the opposition or home/away disparity (though, to be fair, neither does the 3-1-0 system in league football).

In the above system, the “unit” is not a game, but instead a test series (with a 120 maximum points to play for). In a 2-match series, a test win is worth 60 points, whereas the same test win is worth far lesser in a longer series. So, a team could lose all 5 matches away to a strong team, and recoup all those points lost in a 2-test match series at home against a weaker team. For instance, if the Indian team had won 3-1 away in Australia (it won 2-1) in the 4-test match series it would have racked up only 90 points, but would instead win 120 points if it wins 2-0 at home to Sri Lanka in a 2-test series. However, hardly any cricket fan or player would value the latter as the higher achievement in today’s cricketing context.

Therefore, bizarrely, this system rewards doing well in 2-test match series. If I were a team captain, I would be mightily worried when there is a chance of weather disrupting a win in a 2-test match result; one rained out session can see my team lose out on 40 points (60 to 20), and the team would have to work towards winning two test matches from “draw positions” in a 4-match series (10 to 30) to make up for lost points. The ICC could have easily mandated a standard (either 3 or 4) test match series format to prevent this from happening.

With such incentives, it wouldn’t be hard to imagine teams lining up “weaker” opposition at home to rack up the points and game the system. If you think I’m being paranoid, hear me out one last time.

The footballing counterparts of the ICC, FIFA, have a ranking system to rank national football teams. These have ramifications on how teams are slotted in multi-national tournaments (World Cup, Euro etc.). In 2011, Wales were 117^th on the rankings, but in four years, they were in the top-10. How? After their loss to Netherlands, for over 1.5 years, they didn’t play a single non-competitive game which could have affected their ranking. If you’re thinking they were alone, Switzerland and Romania indulged in this as well, gaming the system to rise up the table and getting into more favourable pots and groups in the big tournaments, thus lessening the chances of playing a “big team” in the group stage. Therefore, it isn’t irrational to dream up such a situation in this competition as well.

For all its faults, the pre-existing ICC rankings is a much better system and could have been tweaked for this purpose; after all, it takes into consideration the difficulty of opposition and number of matches, but is much more difficult to understand. If the ICC was worried about the Rankings’ complexity, imagine the confusion that will arise when the dissonance between the Test Championship standings and ICC Test Rankings shows up because of the above factors. If you thought the Test format is hard to explain to a newcomer, the day is not far off when you will have to explain why a test team ranked at number 6 (but is number 2 on the points table due to clever scheduling and optimization) is playing the final. Therefore, it is just a matter of time before the novelty wears off and fans complain about this lopsided system which is at odds with how cricket has been played.

 

 

 

Team balance crucial ahead of World Cup challenge

In what was possibly the most satisfying win on the ODI leg, the Indian cricket team overcame a disastrous start, dug deep to post a competitive total, and later regularly chipped away wickets to bundle out the Kiwis for a fine victory in the final match of the series. A 4-1 series win against a competent New Zealand team (which had the best home Win-Loss record recently) is thoroughly deserved and indeed impressive; what is more, the series was done and dusted in quick time, and with little or no help from India’s champions Jasprit Bumrah and Virat Kohli (the latter for the last 2 matches). What bailed India out of this pickle was India’s depth (more on this shortly).

It was especially pleasing to see the team management take the challenge head on by choosing to bat first on a challenging pitch. As Rohit Sharma stated afterwards, if the series were on the line, they would have chased if they had won the toss. But given that this was a dead rubber, it gave the team a good chance to experiment with the team’s composition and balance. Of course, it was winning the series in good time that gave India the luxury to experiment; taking an unassailable lead against or regularly whitewashing top teams began with Mahendra Singh Dhoni’s reign as ODI skipper.

Before M S Dhoni’s time, India rarely blanked strong opposition (one would have to go back to the ‘80s to see earlier instances of consistent superiority but they were under multiple captains) in order to give the team the wiggle room to test several use cases. Virat Kohli’s team has taken the same template and managed to apply it both at home and abroad. The key factor that helped the Indian team to overcome the Kiwis yesterday was the team composition, depth and balance. And the team balance will be a crucial factor going into and in the World Cup.

India elected to play Vijay Shankar, an all-rounder, in the place of Kuldeep Yadav, therefore lengthening the batting lineup. As a result, the free-swinging Hardik Pandya came in at number 8. This is not to say that Pandya may not have delivered the same blows from number 7, but fans can easily envisage an alternate reality in which the dismissal of Rayudu in the 44^th over would have brought in Bhuvaneshwar Kumar, with 3 pure bowlers to follow. In all probability, the team would have meandered towards a 220 all out. Instead, Rayudu and Jadhav could play with the freedom of knowing that they could take risks given that they had Pandya to follow.

In the batting order, alongside the top 3, the team management seems intent on Dhoni’s presence. Though Dhoni is no longer the batsman who looks good in a #10yearchallenge, he’s still the team’s best batsman in a crisis (think Kingston, the Oval, Chennai, Chennai (again), Dharamshala etc.), even though he didn’t fire on this occasion. This version of Dhoni motors along at ~80 SR and needs a lot of deliveries to come up to speed, which means that his partners need to pick up the slack in these middle-overs-run-milking times. Jadhav and Pandya are some of the fastest scoring batsmen since the 2015 World Cup and their place seems to be justified.

Rayudu, after weathering the initial storm, played the Dhoni role to perfection, but the issue is that he too isn’t too different strike rate wise. Since the 2015 World Cup, Dhoni and Rayudu have been striking it in the low 80s and this approach will surely cost the team on flat pitches if the top order cannot carry on. Besides, India have been behind the curve in the middle orders. No doubt Dhoni gives the team insurance, but it is prudent to push him down the order in the first innings, unless there is a collapse.

What has been papering over the middle overs meandering is the fantastic bowling, although we’re yet to see if India can defend a low-ish score as Pakistan would regularly do so in the 1990s. Bumrah has been a revelation; Shami has staked a strong claim to the opening bowling slot; Bhuvi is great at the death and the two wrist spinners are taking wickets for fun. The problem? Only one of the latter 2 fast men can play and this means that the expensive Hardik Pandya comes in. Even after 44 ODI innings, he bowls ~7 overs per match, conceding 5.5 runs per over and taking wickets at ~40—meaning he’s not a reliable bowler. Additionally, among the top 6, only Jadhav bowls, but even his range is limited; discounting his ODI experience, his List A record shows an experience of—hold your breath— only 192 deliveries (translation: he’s only a couple of matches away from being cruelly figured out and finished as an ODI bowler on the big stage by someone like a Warner); and he’s injury prone to boot. Other players haven’t played enough to cover for these 2 and one hopes that it isn’t a case of too little too late. Dropping a spinner to play a Krunal Pandya or Shankar would have given some indication on contingencies apart from these 2, as a 3 spinner formula won’t make it beyond Asian shores.

If you think that I’m unnecessarily sounding alarmist after a 4-1 victory, please hear me out. The 6-1-4 team configuration is really hard on India as only one bowler can afford to have an off day, which is a mighty ask given that England has some of the flattest pitches since the 2015 World Cup (though the effect of an early summer start on this top order remains to be seen). Remember, this team, despite multiple warnings about the inefficacies of finger spin, steamrolled into the final of the 2017 Champions trophy, and set a date against Pakistan. Cue in the trite “Mauka mauka” sequence—except, the Pakistan team threw caution to the wind and assaulted the Indian finger spinners, practically ending their ODI careers (barring sporadic appearances). Who is to say that this shouldn’t repeat in an all-important knockout match?

Therefore, it would be well worth taking a long, hard look at the team balance, with each configuration bringing in its own tradeoffs, in the remaining few matches. Make no mistake, with 9 group matches and 2 possible knockout matches, this will be a long World cup, and the Indian team has to maintain the balance if it has to be in business in the business end of the quadrennial tournament.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

India’s lower order striking deficiencies

Lower order muscle: The Pandya brothers hold the key to bolstering the Indian lower middle order. Image source:1.

It was the 14^th of July in 2018. The ground was Lord’s.

England faced India in the second match of the ODI leg of the Indian tour to Ireland and England. A mouthwatering clash at the home of cricket between two quality teams. ICC ODI rank 1 vs ICC ODI rank 2. As marquee bilateral fixtures go, it couldn’t get bigger than this.

The England team were beaten comprehensively in the first ODI, first by the wrist spin of Kuldeep Yadav, and then by the Indian top-order blitz. England would respond impressively in the second ODI in the only way they have played ODI cricket recently—by outhitting the opposition. The English players were particularly severe on their nemesis Kuldeep Yadav, smashing him around for 68 runs in his allotted 10 overs. In spite of losing their late middle order lieutenant Jos Buttler, with the help of unheralded all-rounder David Willey at number 8, they were able to zoom to 322 runs in their 50 overs. While Joe Root was the glue that held the batting order together and overcome India’s middle overs boa constrictor squeeze, it was this late burst that gave the advantage to England. With Kohli dismissed in the 27^th over with the score on 140, the wind had been knocked out of the Indian chase and it would limp to 236 all out.

There would be no surprise if these two excellent teams meet in a fixture of massive importance exactly one year, to the day, from this match—the 2019 World Cup final, also at Lord’s. Indeed, these two have been the two outstanding ODI teams since the 2015 World Cup. India have been a consistent ODI team for almost a decade, but it is England’s transformation from ODI duds to trailblazers is indeed the more remarkable story. The two excellent teams have taken two very different paths to the summit of ODI cricket.

For almost two decades now, India has traditionally been the land of good ODI batsmen—Azharrudin, Tendulkar, Ganguly, and Dravid to name a few. The trend continues today with Kohli, Rohit, Dhawan and Dhoni, and the team has some serious bowling chops as well. However, it isn’t fair to say that India has the best ODI batting lineup in the world; that accolade belongs to England, who bat in an explosive manner all through to number 8. As it was the case with India at one point of time, England’s ODI batting strength and depth are the envy of the cricketing world.

In the last few years, the Indian batting order has developed a soft underbelly beneath that impressive top order. While the top 3 are class-leading, the lower middle order is very much behind the curve—and certainly behind England, the cutting edge—in this respect. If the Indian team has ambitions of making the final on 14^th July, it needs to find the balm to soothe this massive headache.

The extent of this problem can be gleaned from statistics. Over the last two years, of the lower middle order batsmen (batting positions 5-7) who have scored at least 300 runs, only two Indian batsmen feature in the list of the top 25 batsmen ordered by strike rate. Even if one were to discount the ones who have inflated figures due to playing the associate teams, this is an alarming fact. For the record, the two aforementioned Indian players are Kedar Jadhav and Hardik Pandya.

Both these players have been good for India in terms of doing the heavy lifting in the end overs, but they have problems of their own. Hardik Pandya’s future is temporarily uncertain, having sipped a very expensive cup of coffee; the diminutive Jadhav has been impressive, but he’s quite injury prone. While Dinesh Karthik and Ambati Rayudu have been drafted into the side and certainly have the capability to be busy, they haven’t traditionally played that role for their state sides. Complicating the matter is that of the veteran champion batsman, M S Dhoni. He’s no more the force that he was, which means that the added pressure of providing impetus falls on the others, as it happened in Australia. Simply put, the Indian team cannot afford to lose either Hardik Pandya or Kedar Jadhav, either to insult or injury.

The Indian team management has often fielded Ravindra Jadeja in the number 7 slot (before Vijay Shankar was given his chance) during Hardik Pandya’s absence. While Ravindra Jadeja is an electrifying fielder, the same adjective cannot be used to describe his limited overs batting. His overall strike rate is ~85 and at number 7, it is worse (82.43)—hardly the kind of number that the opposition would lose sleep over. Make no mistake, he would be a world-class number 8, but with the Indian middle order presently in a state of funk, number 7 would be a step too far for a player of his limited batting abilities.

This is why the team management’s decision to not select Krunal Pandya has been puzzling to say the least. While Vijay Shankar is indeed a legitimate option, Krunal has shown better lower order chops in the IPL and domestic cricket, and has bowled some stifling finger to go on top of his explosive batting. His full range abilities were on display against the England Lions yesterday—six economical overs followed by a late overs charge which set up the India A victory. With him in the team, the team can field three pacers and one wrist spinner, or if the management is feeling too adventurous, it can match England for firepower by including the Pandya brothers and extending the batting order until 8. With Bhuvaneshwar Kumar at 9, one would assume that this is a lower middle order which can go toe to toe with the best in the business.

With just the 9 matches left before the World Cup (the Zimbabwe tour to India is uncertain due to the scheduling conflicts with the IPL), India needs to check all the boxes in order to maximize its chances.

Disclaimer: The image used is not the property of this blog. It has been used for representational purposes only. The copyright, if any, rests with the respective owners.

 

 

 

India’s ODI opening bowling woes

 

Starting trouble: Bhuvi hasn’t been as effective as he would like to be with the new ball. Image source: 1

 

With due apologies to Zimbabwe, who have been pencilled in to visit India in March, just 13 high quality matches remain (3 and 5 away to Australia, followed by 5 home matches against Australia) before the 2019 World Cup in England. Meaning, not a lot of time is left for getting the formula right in time for the World Cup.

Expectations from the Indian fan has changed too, with the Indian ODI side performing consistently well. Eight years ago, the famous World Cup victory in Mumbai seemed like a tryst with destiny, with the stars aligning for MS Dhoni’s team. Now, with strong showings in multi-team tournaments and in ODI tournaments away (such as South Africa and England) since then, it would not be an understatement to say that a semifinal appearance (as it happened in the 2015 World Cup) would most likely be branded as a failure. India’s present position in the ICC ODI rankings (in second place, behind England and well ahead of New Zealand’s third place) is justified.

The pieces have largely fallen in place too; with Ambati Rayudu having made a powerful claim towards solving the middle order riddle, just a few chinks in the armour remain in the ODI juggernaut that is the Indian cricket team. The issue of MS Dhoni’s ODI form is likely to be thorny, but he will most likely be given a free pass to the World Cup. With his place beyond question, the issue of India’s new ball bowler occupies the limelight.

A cursory look at the ICC ODI rankings reveals the extent of this problem. Granted, the ICC rankings aren’t perfect, but it does give a quick indication about which way the “form” wind is blowing. India’s pace spearhead, Jasprit Bumrah, leads the pack comfortably, with the two Indian wrist spinners in the top 6. But it is quite slim pickings after that, with Bhuvaneshwar Kumar occupying the lowly 24^th spot, (on 590 rating points). Don’t be fooled by the official ICC spiel though—it is quite misleading. Take a look for yourself and do the math:

Q: What does it mean to have, say, 500 points?

A: Ratings points have a meaning in the same way as traditional averages do. Over 900 points is a supreme achievement. Few players get there, and even fewer stay there for long. 750 plus is normally enough to put a player in the world top ten. 500 plus is a good, solid rating

With only a handful of teams playing top quality cricket (~10 teams with 5 bowlers each), 24^th spot is therefore only a middling return, a whole new world away from world class levels.

As the ICC rankings have revealed similarly, over the last two years, many bowlers have done quite well in the opening position. However, there are very few Indian faces among them. Looking at the bowling averages of players who have nabbed at least 20 wickets in the first two bowling positions (i.e. taking the new ball), Bumrah and Woakes have been standout performers, along with Starc, Hazlewood and Boult. India’s other representative, Bhuvaneshwar Kumar, props up the table with a below-par bowling average of 38.

I must admit that it is a tad harsh to point fingers at Bhuvi alone. Make no mistake, he’s shown fantastic nous at the death (as has Bumrah), but the lack of sting at the beginning has come to haunt India many times (2017 Champions Trophy final, anyone?). Over the last 3 years, India lags England, South Africa and New Zealand in terms of wicket taking with the new ball and this is a major weakness for a side that harbours ambitions of leaving behind a lasting legacy.

There is an additional angle to this problem, which is revealed by the ICC batting ODI rankings. One look at the batting rankings reveals that the last few years has been the era of the top order batsman (interested readers could peruse a detailed analysis of top order run inflation here). Of the top 20 spots, the only non-top order batsmen mixing it with the batting elite from the top order are Ross Taylor, Mushfiqur Rahim, Jos Buttler and Eoin Morgan—slim pickings overall. As ODI teams become more top heavy, taking wickets with the new ball and exposing the relatively fragile middle order is crucial to knock the wind out of the power hitting ODI teams of today; as it is, two new balls and smaller grounds have only complicated this problem.

This is not to say that India have not tried. In fact, they have tried many combinations since the last World Cup but no one apart from Bumrah has stuck. For instance, the Hardik Pandya new ball experiment was tried and abandoned some time ago. Mohammed Shami has hardly bowled in ODIs after playing through the pain barrier in the 2015 World Cup. Umesh Yadav sparkled with the new ball in the previous IPL but it hasn’t quite translated into team India ODI performances. Siddharth Kaul, Khaleel Ahmed and Deepak Chahar have been given chances but only Khaleel has shown glimpses of what he’s capable of (against West Indies). At some point, the team management must be hoping that one of these changes works out. After all, there is only so much clawing back that Bumrah, Kuldeep and Chahal can do. If Khaleel Ahmed can impress on the Australia tour, the slot will practically be his; his left arm angle is an added advantage as well.

Jasprit Bumrah has rightly earned himself a rest after a gruelling year and Mohammed Siraj has been named in his place for the upcoming fixtures against Australia and New Zealand. With India’s top pacer sitting out two tough assignments, this is a golden opportunity for a new face to grab the limelight and solve this long-standing Achilles heel at the earliest. If the Indian team doesn’t find an answer to this issue, it can rear its ugly head during an important knockout match, thus bringing an end to its World Cup hopes.

Disclaimer: The image used is not property of this blog. It has been used for representational purposes only. The copyright, if any, rests with the respective owners.

 

The muddle in the middle

Pining for a spine: Various Indian cricketers are under the spotlight with less than a year to go for the World Cup. Image source: 1.

A couple of days ago, a controversy lurked in the lead-up to the Asia Cup. The Mumbai Mirror reported that the broadcaster, having paid hefty sums to obtain the television rights for the series, had apparently been miffed at Virat Kohli’s absence from the forthcoming Asia Cup fixtures. While it can be easily argued that the broadcaster has no right to interfere in the team selection, we are taking a longer argument to say that Kohli’s absence from the tournament is a blessing in disguise for India, considering the muddle in the middle order. Hold on to that thought.

Not so long ago, the Indian team set sail (metaphorically) to England, hoping to compete on even terms on a lengthy tour. They showed plenty of pluck, especially during the limited overs leg, when they brushed aside the hosts. However, familiar failings reared their ugly heads by making recurrent appearances. The victories were a case in point; India won the 1^st and 3^rd T20I, and the 1^st ODI quite comfortably. In each match, at least one member of the top order batted deep into the match. What about the matches India lost? The team lost steam once the top 3 were dismissed cheaply, and this has been India’s bane for quite a while now. Sadly, this was not the dress rehearsal that the team hoped for with less than one year to go for the 2019 World Cup.

Truth be told, the Indian ODI team has struggled for lumbar support in the middle order, especially in positions 4-7 for a while now. Since the 2015 World Cup, India’s top order has been in spectacular form; scoring at nearly 58 runs per dismissal at a ~92 SR, it is the envy of world cricket. On the other hand, India’s middle order (batting positions 4-7) is middling, with South Africa’s and England’s collective records well ahead of everyone else’s. India’s stats lie alongside those of Pakistan, Bangladesh and New Zealand. As fellow thREAD contributor put it recently, India’s top order has been babysitting the lower middle order. With the 2019 World Cup looming in the distance, India has to quickly solve its middle order riddle. Only Dhoni can be considered as a fixture, as he has scored runs consistently, though he has found some difficulty in raising the tempo from the get-go (more on this shortly).

The Indian ODI side’s most glaring holes are in the number 4 and 5 slots. In the 62 matches since the 2015 World Cup, 17 players have occupied these positions, collectively averaging ~35 runs per dismissal and second only to a Sri Lankan team that has been in lengthy transition.

The Asia cup represents a lifeline for the various candidates in contention for a middle-order berth. To make matters worse, candidates who are waiting in the wings such as Shreyas Iyer and Rishabh Pant (not including the dropped Rahane) are essentially top order batsmen who have to audition for a spot in the middle order. Barring a major miracle, the selectors seem to have moved on from Yuvraj, Raina and Rahane.

K L Rahul looks primed to bat at number 3. The team management fancies him and his skills, and with a big knock in the last test match, he has played himself back into contention. With the best teams looking to flex their muscle at the top, he is no doubt the favourite to take Kohli’s slot.

Similarly, Hardik Pandya’s slot is set in stone, unless unfavourable circumstances dictate otherwise. Though he may not be a test-class bowler at this stage, there is little doubt about his utility as an ODI all-rounder. His useful bowling, electric fielding and high-risk, high-reward batting are made for the limited overs formats. He is yet to cement his place in the side, but due to the TINA (There Is No Alternative) factor, he is probably assured of a spot barring a major injury or loss of form.

Amongst the others, the little man making a comeback after an injury is a favourite to grab another middle order slot (mostly at six). Jadhav has many reasons going for him: one, he has India’s second best lower middle order record after Dhoni; second, he has adapted his batting style to suit the hustle and bustle of the end-overs, treading a fine balance between madness and method; and finally, Pandya cannot be relied upon to complete his 10 overs in ODIs just yet (or rather, any bowler can have a bad day). Jadhav, with his weird bowling action, represents the only form of insurance. With Rohit and Kohli not bowling anymore and with Raina and Yuvraj out of the side, he’s the only batsman with some recent bowling experience; though, it feels odd that India has to rely on someone who has bowled only 755 List A deliveries to date, with 593 of those coming in the ODIs that he played in and resulting in some comical wickets. One way of looking at it is that it was an inspired gamble by Dhoni; the other way is that he is two matches away from his career as a bowler being cruelly finished at the big stage. Either way, he is the man for the job for now; it would be a stretch to expect someone else to take the gloves from Dhoni so that the latter can add to his ODI wicket tally.

Now to Dhoni—why shouldn’t he be pushed up the order in ODI cricket to get the best out of his abilities?

To date, Dhoni has batted in the top 4 only in 45 out of his 274 innings—a measly 16.4%. Dhoni’s average batting position is ~5.5 which shows that he has largely batted in the lower middle order. That he has amassed nearly 10,000 runs batting at such a low position is an outstanding achievement and a testament to his prowess in the ODI game. In comparison, other members of the ODI 10k run club mostly batted in the top 4. What is more, whenever Dhoni has been given the opportunity higher up, he has performed excellently, averaging more than ~82 and ~55 runs per dismissal at no. 3 and 4 respectively (only 2 innings at no.2).

For some reason, the team management has always been averse to the idea of Dhoni following Kohli in the batting order. This can be gleaned by looking at the partnership data. Between the third and the fifth wicket partnerships, Kohli and Dhoni have batted together only 40 times over nearly a decade of playing together. For the 3^rd wicket you ask? It has happened only 5 times. With these two proven, experienced performers, it looks like the team think-tank want to spread the experience and hedge their bets against a rampaging pacer ripping apart the top order and exposing the lower middle order.

While it is a valid concern, it must be noted that Dhoni is perhaps the most adept at handling pressure situations in ODI cricket. His batting record in dire circumstances while batting in the lower middle order has been the stuff of legend. The following two tweets published last year provide a snapshot about his “iceman” status. Without a doubt, he has been the man for crisis situations.

https://twitter.com/SampathStats/status/939796916287651841

https://twitter.com/Rehan_ulhaq/status/939794704497078272

With such a track record, such fears are unfounded and one would have to back him to come up with the goods when the team needs it the most. After all, it must be remembered that not so long ago, Sachin Tendulkar was pushed down the order to avoid “exposing” him to the new ball, but the little master proved everyone wrong by continuing to perform excellently at the opening position.

Though Dhoni has a healthy overall strike rate of ~83, a recent drawback in his game has been a decline in his power hitting capabilities—especially from the first ball. Since the World cup, barring Ajinkya Rahane, Dhoni has been slower (in Strike rate terms) compared to all his other ODI teammates who have scored 300 runs. In fact, readers may recall that this was the basis of our argument of him not deserving a batting slot in the T20I side for a really long time (but he’s answered most of his critics with a fantastic IPL 2018). As discussed earlier, Dhoni has been taking much longer to get going, and this has resulted in him making up his strike rate only much later in the innings. With this in mind, it makes sense to shift him to number 4—where he can bide his time, knock the ball around and get primed to launch an assault by the time the middle overs are done, with batting depth to follow. IPL 2018 has shown us glimpses of what this all-time legend can be, given the right batting opportunities. Though Dhoni has coveted that position for long, he hasn’t really got an extended opportunity higher up the batting order. After years of superlative service, he has earned the right to bat at the point where the batting order pivots, much like Imran Khan in the twilight of his career at the 1992 World Cup.

The other remaining slot will be a toss-up between Rayudu, Pandey and Karthik, which is a real head-scratcher. Would you pick Rayudu, who had a great IPL, or Pandey, who had an average IPL but did well on the sidelines to make the India squad? Or will it be Karthik, who had a good series in Sri Lanka and the IPL but faded away in the England tour? We’d plump for Pandey, but your guess is as good as ours. In any case, the Asia cup is a good low-spotlight stage for this audition. Without the safety net of Kohli, the relatively safe environs of the Asia cup is no doubt the best place to check out the middle order candidates.

Disclaimer: The images used in this article are not the property of this blog. They have been used for representational purposes only. The copyright, if any, rests with the respective owners.

 

Aiming for two birds with one stone

 

Playing with the big boys: Mirroring Afghanistan’s own rise, Rashid Khan has gone from strength to strength. Image source: 1.

After blanking Bangladesh in the T20 series in Dehradun, Afghanistan is set to play their first ever test match at Bengaluru against India. This historic moment is yet another marker of the team’s progress, and at the same time, a wonderful opportunity for the players to test themselves against elite opposition. The news of their country’s cricket team doing well would have no doubt brought a lot of joy to their supporters.

Over the last few years, the Afghanistan cricket team has gone from strength to strength. In 2013, they qualified for the 2015 ODI World Cup in Australia (they made the cut for the 2019 edition against all odds in the recent ICC qualifiers). It was in 2015 that they won their first ever series against a full member (Zimbabwe); a year later, they beat the eventual champions, the West Indies, in the World T20. Over the last few years, their progress has been nothing short of meteoric: not only have they beaten Zimbabwe and Ireland, but they have also recorded a win against the West Indies on Caribbean shores; and now, they have whitewashed Bangladesh.

The star of the team has been undoubtedly been Rashid Khan, the young leggie who has hoodwinked batsmen world over with his delightful wrist spin. What is more, he has also proved his mettle against some of the world’s leading players, playing pivotal roles for several T20 franchises that availed his services. And this is what multi-national, professional T20 competitions have done—they have given these opportunities (where a player can test, evaluate and improve themselves) to players like Rashid Khan and Mujeeb Ur Rahman.

On the other hand, Test cricket is an exclusive club, with an extremely high entry barrier. The test arena is where newer teams have traditionally floundered due to a lack of early exposure. A case in point is the test cricketing record of Bangladesh. They made their test debut in 2000 (against India), but it took them over a 100 test matches in total to win against England, the game’s ultimate establishment team. But this victory should also be been in context; they achieved this result against a nation which had a 200 year old history of first class cricket.

In fact, if one were to compare the records of Bangladesh and India in their first 100 odd test matches, they are eerily similar. Before Bangladesh, India was perhaps the underachiever in test cricket. In the first 116 matches that India played, it won only 15 matches (3 of them abroad against a weak New Zealand team). Present-day Bangladesh have won 9 matches in their first 100 tests, four of them abroad—against West Indies, Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka. This is not a one off example. New Zealand’s first win against an establishment team (England/Australia) came in its 113^th test match; similarly, Sri Lanka’s inaugural victory was achieved in its 45^th test outing. So, Ireland’s showing in its first test was certainly admirable, even though they lost to Pakistan.

The basic issue that new teams face is the lack of competitive fixtures and a patronizing attitude from the establishment. Back in the day, English star cricketers would refuse to travel to India without an inducement of a guaranteed purse. The situation hasn’t changed much even today— why, Australia cancelled its Bangladesh tour recently. Authorities continue to groan about how new teams aren’t competitive, but without a chance to face the big boys, it is daft to expect the new teams to do any different compared to what their predecessors have done in the absence of requisite exposure. In short, test cricket suffers from a massive chicken-and-egg problem, which can be seen in the disparity between the fixtures of a team in their infancy and England’s calendar.

 

Team	Year of debut	Number of test matches played in 15 years since debut	Number of test matches played by England in the 15 year period
South Africa	1889	11	45
West Indies	1928	22	88
New Zealand	1930	14	72
India	1932	16	64
Pakistan	1952	50	139
Sri Lanka	1982	68	156
Zimbabwe	1992	83	178
Bangladesh	2000	88	188

 

On the other end of the spectrum is a team like India with superstar players, fantastic feeder structure, a retinue of specialist coaches, analysts and so on. In spite of all this, they weren’t able to win the series in South Africa. While it is true that this has been an era of home dominance, the truth is that they didn’t give themselves the best chance to compete on even ground.

Firstly, there wasn’t much gap between the Sri Lanka series and the South Africa one, but that could have been mitigated by sending test specialists earlier to South Africa in order to facilitate better acclimatising (incidentally, a fellow thREAD contributor wrote about this recently). Secondly, India dropped its only tour game ahead of the first test, citing a need for a higher intensity. With the series lost, Ravi Shastri talked about how an additional ten days would have made a difference to the Indian team. Great insight, Einstein!

Better late than never though; the Indian team management has taken note of this, and players like Pujara and Ishant are currently playing county cricket (Kohli will be missing his stint due to injury) ahead of the series against England.

But truth be told, Kohli and co. weren’t entirely off about some of the concerns regarding warm-up games. These largely feature experimental sides with almost everyone getting a chance to bowl and bat. A 2 or 3 day fixture against a lightweight provincial side neither serves as a proving ground nor replicates the seriousness of a test match. Also, to keep the mystery intact, teams often dish out unrepresentative pitches to the touring sides while holding back their top bowlers. The warm-up fixtures are never telecast due to a combination of these factors as well.

Is there a way the two needs can be resolved? How about putting two and two together?

One obvious solution to address this demand-supply problem is to pencil in the newbie sides for full test fixtures against touring established sides. To elaborate, while it is great that Afghanistan are getting a match against India, this serves only one purpose of competitive exposure. India would not be getting much out of this fixture given that the match is in India, especially when they are due to play England on English shores following this match. One can expect history to repeat itself if India don’t learn from the mistakes of the South African tour. Imagine, for instance, India facing Ireland on English shores in a test match prior to the England series (similar to what Pakistan did, and, incidentally they beat England in the first test before reverting to type in the second). A test match like this will serve the dual purposes of practice and vital competitive exposure. To ease Ireland (or Afghanistan or any other new team) in, it would be great if they play a few first class fixtures of their own in order in the local host country to hone their own skills.

In order to make the logistics smooth, it is best to anchor these fixtures on the basis of geography and the traditional home season of the local host. The sub-continent can thus serve as a base for Afghanistan, where they can travel to India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and UAE to play matches against various sides; England can be Ireland’s base; South Africa would be the obvious choice for Zimbabwe’s. Right now, there are no teams of similar aptitude around Australia and West Indies (some would argue that West Indies themselves are at that level now), but that shouldn’t be the basis for denying the present teams in dire need of competitive fixtures.

Of course, this idea hasn’t yet addressed how much the international calendar should yield to this, but on a rough estimate, it would probably be in the range of 1-2 weeks given 2 away tours on an average per big team per year. And the newbie teams would be exposed to at least 2-3 test matches a year against top class opposition, apart from test matches between themselves and first class fixtures, which should fast-track their initiation to test cricket. Also, as a sweetener, a full test match would probably yield much more viewership compared to a warm-up fixture for the aspirant broadcasters of the visiting teams.

Unfortunately, the cricketing administrators and boards missed this trick when they came up with the latest Future tours program (FTP). As a result, these fixtures are conspicuous by their absence. This no doubt reeks of the same exclusivist mindset, further perpetuating entrenched attitudes. Hopefully, with the World test championship coming into play, this issue will be sorted out.

Disclaimer: The image used in this article is not the property of this blog. It has been used for representational purposes only. The copyright, if any, rests with the respective owners.

 

 

 

 

 

Indian wrist spinners no longer second class ODI citizens

Ignored no more: Anil Kumble suffered a bias against wrist spinners throughout his ODI career. Image source: 1.

The shoe is finally on the other foot.

For years now, wrist spinners in India had to wonder what they had to do to get the selectors’ attention. After Anil Kumble’s last one day international (ODI) in 2007 till the end of 2015, a grand total of three wrist spinners had played for India in ODIs (not counting the batsmen-turned-part-timers, of course). In case you’re wondering about their names, they are Piyush Chawla, Amit Mishra and Karn Sharma—who played a cumulative 55 ODIs in these 8 odd years.  Spare a thought for poor ol’ Amit Mishra—the man with an ODI average of under 27, and the Indian with the most IPL wickets—but hardly got a chance to play against the big boys.

Player name	Matches played	Wickets	Bowling average
Amit Mishra	28	47	26.14
Piyush Chawla	25	32	34.90
Karn Sharma	2	0	–

Table 1: List of Indian wrist spinners who played for India in the ODI format between 20th March 2007 and 31st December 2015

Coincidentally, Indian badminton has experienced an upswing since 2007. Is this due to a case of young boys with powerful wrists taking up the game after being dissuaded by the fates of Indian wrist spinners unfolding on and off the field? Jokes aside, back then, it wasn’t a stretch to call Indian wrist spinners as second class ODI citizens. Why, even during the peerless Anil Kumble’s playing career, after Harbhajan Singh burst on to the scene, the legend didn’t feature many times in the Indian team—missing 153 games in the process.

If one had switched on the television or an online stream to watch the latest ODI series featuring India, he/she would have certainly wondered what the fuss is all about. With Kuldeep Yadav and Yuzvendra Chahal spinning a web against the Sri Lankans and the Aussies in the middle overs, the hard times faced by the practitioners of wrist spin seemed to be a distant memory; even forgotten, perhaps. However, old timers will note that the dark decades of the ‘70s and ‘80s were the worst for a wrist spinner when they were on the list of endangered species all over the cricketing world.

Spin bowling started losing favour in the early 1970s. John Snow headlined the 1970-71 and 1972 Ashes with Derek Underwood playing a parsimonious support act. A few years later, after losing test matches against the Australians and Indians in the 1975-76 season, Clive Lloyd’s West Indies turned to build a four-man demolition squad of fast bowlers which would terrorize batsmen world over for more than a generation. Naturally, other teams followed suit with fast bowlers of their own; even India, who often opened with a gentle medium pacer before tossing the ball to the members of the spin quartet, had found Kapil Dev in the golden age of fast bowling. The ones to suffer from this fast bowling tilt were the spin bowlers, and the situation only turned from bad to worse during the subsequent decade of the 1980s.

Particularly, one of the most difficult cricketing skills to master—wrist spin—had few takers during the dark decades of the ‘70s and ’80s when Pakistan’s Abdul Qadir was fighting a lone battle to keep the art alive. Since wrist spin involves spinning the ball using a full flick of the wrist and fingers, it is notoriously difficult to control and even more difficult to master. Invariably, a wrist spinner would bowl a bad delivery every other over which would duly be dispatched to the boundary. Hence, they were often labelled as high risk options, especially with teams coming to grips with ODI format where run containment was a premium. In the aforementioned time period of ‘70s and ’80s, fast bowling was seen as the key to test match success and spin was largely relegated to a defensive role; there were fears that wrist spin would totally disappear from the circuit. Batting skills against spin also took a backseat.

	Player name	Matches	Wickets	Bowling average
1	Abdul Qadir	57	216	32.31
2	RJ Shastri	69	141	39.51
3	Iqbal Qasim	32	131	24.99
4	JE Emburey	55	120	39.65
5	B Yardley	19	89	28.64
6	Tauseef Ahmed	28	87	29.57
7	JG Bracewell	35	82	37.28
8	Maninder Singh	34	81	38.8
9	PH Edmonds	33	76	39.76
10	DR Doshi	23	74	34.35
11	NS Yadav	26	70	38.71
12	SL Boock	21	57	35.22
13	NGB Cook	15	52	32.48
14	RJ Bright	20	46	41.13
15	RA Harper	24	45	27.82
16	ND Hirwani	7	42	20.71

Table 2: List of spinners who captured the most test wickets in between 1st January 1980 and 31st December 1989.

The list of spin bowling wicket takers in the trough of the 1980s tells the tale of wrist spinning gloom and doom. Ploughing a lonely furrow for the tribe of wrist spinners, the effervescent Abdul Qadir is perched firmly at the top with 216 wickets at a bowling average of 32.31; Ravi Shastri, with 141 victims off his left-arm-whatever at a bowling average of nearly 40, followed. Fourteen more finger spinners dot the list after Abdul Qadir, before the next wrist spinner appears in this list, namely Narendra Hirwani—who snared 42 wickets (16 of them in one game). Finger spinners were dotting the team sheets with such regularity that drinking games involving their inevitable selection could have been invented.

The face of wrist spin would change with the emergence of Shane Warne, Anil Kumble, Mushtaq Ahmed and co. in the 1990s. For nearly a decade and half, they bamboozled batsmen with their guile, control and variations. Shane Warne dragging Australia back from the dead in the 1999 World Cup semifinal and Anil Kumble bundling out six Windies for 12 runs are fond memories of that era. Unfortunately, after their retirement, wrist spin went underground for a few years yet again. In the era of ODI cricket that followed the retirement of the various wrist spinning doyens, the field turned barren with captains choosing safety and miserly spinners of the orthodox and mystery variety. However, in what has been a pleasant twist, the art-form has seen a renaissance in recent times. The lessons from the slam-bang nature of T20 and the fielding restrictions in the middle overs of the ODIs (hitherto the “boring” part of the ODI) have turned the situation on its head.

Player name	Matches	Wickets	Bowling average
Imran Tahir	40	62	27.67
AU Rashid	46	68	32.05
A Zampa	26	37	32.62
MJ Santner	37	38	37.07
M M Ali	41	28	59.50

Table 3: List of ODI spin bowlers with the best bowling averages since 1^st April 2015 against the top 9 ODI nations (minimum 25 wickets). All stats accurate till 4^th October 2017

Since the 2015 World cup, finger spinners have found the going tough in ODI cricket. The most successful spin bowlers since the last World cup have all been wrist spinners (minimum of 25 wickets against the top 9 ODI teams). In what has been a clear role reversal, New Zealand’s Mitchell Santner has been the only reasonably successful (if you can call it that) finger spinner at a bowling average of ~37. After getting drubbed in the recent Champions Trophy final against Pakistan, though a bit late to the game, it is no wonder that India turned to wrist spinners of their own.

This recent revival of wrist spin in ODIs has been due to a host of factors. One, pitches all over the world have been flat with the conditions being loaded in the favour of batsmen (the average score since 1^st April 2015 has been 272 runs); fielding restrictions have only added fuel to the fire with fewer boundary riders in the middle overs—meaning, today’s batsmen are going hell for leather more than ever; factors such as dew—which are almost a given during day-night matches held in the subcontinent—make it more difficult for the finger spinner to thrive.

Therefore, in today’s times, the best antidote for aggressive batsmen (the majority of whom are right handers) is to impart more spin on the ball and take it away from their preferred hitting zones on the leg side. Funnily, wrist spin needed batting to evolve to current T20-fuelled ballistic levels and to be countered with a high risk, high reward bowling deterrent.  With the spinning of the powerplay wheel and a combination of other factors, wrist spinners are surviving and thriving by remaining relevant even on the dreariest of surfaces in the shorter formats. It is early days still, but following worldwide trends, Indian wrist spinners are perhaps no longer second class ODI citizens.

Disclaimer: The image used in this article is not property of this blog. It has been used for representational purposes only. The copyright, if any, rests solely with its owners.

 

 

 

 

The overseas bowling puzzle for India

The recently concluded, enthralling test series between India and Australia represented a watershed moment for the Indian cricket team. In the process of defeating Australia in the final test in Dharamshala, it became the third country (after Australia and South Africa) to hold all bilateral trophies in test cricket (concerning its own team, of course) at the same point of time. From Steven Smith’s quip of being one or two sessions away from the Australian team retaining the Border-Gavaskar trophy after the Pune reverse to winning the series at Dharamshala, this was a stunning reaction from the Virat Kohli led team. Of course, India having played most of its recent tests at home has contributed to some part of this achievement; greater challenges lie abroad.

The spin twins: Who will make the cut in an overseas test? Image source: 1.

The bedrock of this match-winning juggernaut has been built on the foundation of a well-oiled bowling unit. Leading from the front are India’s two match winning spinners, Ravindra Jadeja and Ravichandran Ashwin. Ranked 1 and 3 (Ashwin was ranked at 2 when the series concluded) on the ICC player rankings, they have been at the forefront of dismantling opposition teams at home—emulating the illustrious Bishan Singh Bedi and Bhagwath Chandrashekhar, who occupied the top two slots way back in 1974. Ashwin even managed to breach the elite 900 ranking points level, hitherto unscaled by Indian bowlers.

However, the two spinners took contrasting paths during the extended home season.  Ashwin took off from where he left, becoming the third player (after Malcolm Marshall and Imran Khan, no less) to snare four consecutive Man-of-the-series awards with his showing against the New Zealand team. However, he ran into a wall (relatively speaking) in the form of the English team. He wasn’t able to run amok against Bangladesh or Australia either; his batting form tailed off as well.

Of course, injury might have played some part in his less-than-stellar showing; during the home season, Ashwin bowled over 700 overs and picked up 82 wickets (a record). He was first picked for the Ranji trophy quarterfinal match against Karnataka, and subsequently withdrew due to a sports hernia to recuperate. The same injury reared its ugly head after the India-Australia series, and the bowler rightly gave the IPL a skip.

On the other hand, Ravindra Jadeja went from strength to strength as the home season progressed. He maintained a high level for the first three series, and was the standout performer in the Border-Gavaskar trophy, usurping his teammate Ashwin from the top of the ICC rankings. He too missed the initial matches of the IPL, but his improved test match prowess hasn’t exactly boosted his IPL showings. Both of these bowlers were ineffectual during the Champions trophy.

Versus team (number of tests)	Ravichandran Ashwin		Ravindra Jadeja
	Wickets	Bowling avg.	Wickets	Bowling avg.
New Zealand (3)	27	17.77	14	24.07
England (5)	28	30.25	26	25.84
Bangladesh (1)	6	28.50	6	24.66
Australia (4)	21	27.38	25	18.56
Recent ODIs
Champions trophy	1	167	4	62.25

This raises an interesting conundrum with tours to Sri Lanka in July-August and away to South Africa in December-January: what will India’s bowling combination be when it tours different countries?

When India last toured many overseas countries in 2014, Ashwin had been left out of the eleven seven times in nine test matches. He was dropped after he bowled 42 overs at the Wanderers with nothing to show in the wickets column. The man who replaced him in the next test was Ravindra Jadeja—who toiled for 58.2 overs in the first innings, but got 6 wickets. Even the unheralded Karn Sharma leapfrogged him in Adelaide.

Ashwin didn’t impress when he got the chance in England or Australia either. After a period of introspection, he turned a corner and has been a different bowler since. But the question remains—who will be the primary spinner when India tours? What would be done with Kuldeep Yadav, another interesting prospect?

Fortunately, there exists a period in India’s recent cricketing past when the team faced a similar conundrum—the spinners being the previous Indian coach Anil Kumble, and the man who Ashwin replaced, Harbhajan Singh.

Between Harbhajan Singh’s debut test (25^th March 1998) and Anil Kumble’s final test (2^nd November 2008), India played toured many a country abroad. In 20 of these matches, both Kumble and Harbhajan featured.  Sometimes, one player was favoured over the other—Kumble made the cut 26 times, whereas Harbhajan was picked 12 times.  Is there any evidence that playing one or two spinners led to the other bowling better?

	Alone	Together
Kumble	34.35	35.38
Harbhajan	38.60	40.27

The effect, if any, is quite marginal. In fact, the statistics show that both spinners bowled marginally better alone (overall bowling figures are woeful, nonetheless). The choice of bowling combination is revealing in terms of the opposition strength; they featured in tandem mostly for tests against “weaker” nations like Zimbabwe, Bangladesh and West Indies, and against stronger opposition at well-known spin friendly venues like Galle, The Oval, Sydney and their ilk.

Keeping this in mind, it will be interesting to see the Indian team’s approach when it lines up against teams abroad. Would it pick one over the other? Will the team management play both in a five bowler combination, and hope for the lower order to click? Which two spinners will they play? Will there be a third spinner in this equation on overseas rank turners? Here is the flexible approach that Anil Kumble had advocated before his time as the Indian coach:

“We have gone into this theory of three seamers and one spinner the moment we sit on an aircraft which travels more than seven hours – that’s the mindset… If your 20 wickets are going to come with two spinners and two fast bowlers, so be it. If it comes with three spinners and one fast bowler so be it.”

To his credit, Kumble stuck to his philosophy during his tenure. Now if India worked out a bowler management program to go along with an approach like this, it would have a great chance of competing with the best sides overseas. But with Kumble being no more associated with the Indian team and Ravi Shastri yet to air his views regarding this in public, the Indian team’s strategy remains to be seen.

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